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AN EVALUATION OF PAST AND CURRENT LEGAL
APPROACHES TO VINDICATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE
OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
ROBERT L. CARTER*
FORWARD
As this paper is being written, the Senate and the House have enact-
ed bills restricting busing and court authority to order it as a means of
securing equal educational opportunity for black children.** While the
Senate bill is somewhat less repressing than that enacted by the House,
national legislative disapproval of the use of busing as a technique to
enforce the fourteenth amendment's mandate of equal educational op-
portunity is manifest. The President has made a televised address to
the nation scoring busing for integration and has sent to both houses a
proposal for (1) a moratorium on the federal courts requiring busing
for the purposes of integration, (2) a prohibition on court power to
order busing for purposes of integrated schooling, and has ordered the
Department of Justice to intervene in pending cases before the federal
* Member of the New York Bar. A.B., 1937, Lincoln University; LL.B., 1940,
Howard University; LL.M., 1941, Columbia University.
** Since the writing of this article there have been two significant developments
pertaining to school desegregation. First, in reversing the district court opinion in
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972) the court of
appeals stated:
Because we are unable to discern any constitutional violation in the estab-
lishment and maintenance of these three school districts, nor any unconstitu-
tional consequence of such maintenance, we hold that it was not within
the district judge's authority to order the consolidation of these three separate
political subdivisions of the Commonwealth of Virginia. When it became
"clear that state-imposed segregation . . . [had] been completely removed,"
* . . within the school district of the City of Richmond, as adjudged by the
district court, further intervention by the district court was neither necessary
nor justifiable.
Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, No. 72-1058-60, 72-1150, slip opinion at 29 (4th
Cir., June 5, 1972). Secondly, H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) pertaining
to limitations on school busing, was passed by the House. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 18,
1972, § 1, at 1, col. 8. The Senate has not taken final action on the bill. See N.Y.
Times, Aug. 19, 1972, at 9, col. 1. See also Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 801 et seq.
(June 23, 1972), 86 Stat. 235. [Editor's note]
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courts where busing has been ordered by lower court ruling. Numer-
ous factions are advocating a constitutional amendment to bar busing
to achieve equal educational opportunity for black children insofar as
that fourteenth amendment right requires a classroom mix of black and
white children for school purposes.
The specifics of the legal implications of this recent flurry of Con-
gressional action and presidential intervention in this field are not al-
together clear. What seems clear enough, however, is that school dis-
tricts that have not integrated their schools will not be placed under
federal order to do so through the use of busing for some time to come;
that school districts that have completed the process of school integra-
tion through busing will be under pressure to roll back the clock; and
that the remedy through interdistrict mergers to effectuate school inte-
gration, such as ordered in Bradley v. School Board of Richmond,' will
gain few federal court adherents, at least until the legal implications and
constitutionality of whatever law Congress is certain to enact on this
issue has been determined by the United States Supreme Court. As a
consequence, in the short run, and perhaps in the long run as well, civil
rights advocates will be forced to give careful scrutiny to those trends in
the law which propose to eliminate the black child's constitutional dep-
rivations by means of a modernized version of the discarded Plessy v.
Ferguson' formula for guaranteeing equal educational opportunity.
Reform of state funding formulae to equalize per capita funding for
school purposes,3 will probably come under increased court pressure.
Community control, or decentralization, at least to the extent that it
now exists in New York City-local school districts within the city are
given a limited amount of say about school affairs in the district but
with ultimate control of the school system remaining in the hands of a
centralized authority-will probably become more widespread. Ten
years hence whether we will be any closer to quality education or equal
education for black children is, of course, highly problematical. Un-
happily, the fierce resistance to the implementation of Brown v. Board
of Education4 in the South and to its application to de facto school
1.2338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd, Nos. 72-1058-60, 72-1150, (4th Cir.
June 5, 1972).
2. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
3. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D.
Tex. 1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[Vol. 1972:479
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss3/5
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
segregation in the North, the widespread and often hysterical opposi-
tion to busing and to the development of metropolitan school districts
to eliminate school segregation, particularly in urban areas North and
South, suggest that the white community in this country is at the present
time prepared only to give lip service to the fourteenth amendment
mandate guaranteeing equal educational opportunity.
INTRODUCTION
Not long ago, the noneducated man could rise to fame and fortune
in the United States through the use of ingenuity and industry. To-
day, that era has ended. We now live not only in a highly mechanized
society but in one rapidly approaching cybernetics where economic
success is functionally related to education. Our economy is increas-
ingly service-oriented. Employment in the skilled trades frequently
requires knowledge obtainable only through a fairly rigorous academic
program, or to put it more precisely perhaps, the gateway to a skilled
job is thorough learning in rudimentary academics-the higher the
skill, the greater the necessary academic grasp. Thus, today, as never
before, education is the key to employability, and meaningful employ-
ment is the passport to the bounty of our society.
A good education, therefore, is nothing short of critical for black
Americans because of the very real correlation between academic skills
and employment, income and anti-social conduct.5 Black people rec-
ognize that education has traditionally been the avenue of upward mo-
bility in American life. Thus, their rightful demand for equal edu-
cational opportunities for blacks is now so economically essential that
it is not amiss to classify it as one of the "basic" civil rights."
Moreover, education bears a close relationship to other public non-
economic needs of a democratic society. Without it there can be no
intelligent use of the franchise, and reliance cannot be placed on the
first amendment to insure effective public influence on the decision-
making process. In short, the United States will not be able to hold it-
self out as either a free or a democratic society without an educated
5. J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPoRTUNIrY (1966); UNITED
STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ON RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
(1967).
6. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Certainly if the "right" to have
children is a basic civil right, then the "right" of a parent to support those children
must assume equal dimensions.
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citizenry. Due to the correlation between education and democratic
institutions, the right to equal educational opportunities is, in truth,
"a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights."'7 As
such, it should be accorded a preferred status and given substantial,
not minimal, protection. In ordering the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare to conduct a survey of educational opportunity be-
cause "of the fundamental significance of educational opportunity to
many social issues today . . . ." Congress recognized the essentiality
of equal educational opportunity for the underprivileged.8
Yet, it is distressingly evident that the nation's public school system
is not providing a large percentage of blacks with even rudimentary
skills in reading, writing and arithmetic. Many persons in the black
community view the public school failure to provide its youth with the
necessary educational tools for upward social and economic mobility
as an aspect of the conscious and callous suppression to which blacks
are subjected by the white majority in this supposedly free and demo-
cratic society.
This widely held conviction helps feed the flames of black discontent
and disaffection and increases black distrust of white institutions and
individuals-all of which, of course, furthers black-white polarization.
Blacks are losing faith in the efficacy of the law as well, since, accord-
ing to the law, they are entitled to the very educational opportunities
and advantages they seek and have thus far been unable to obtain.
Although firmly established under law that educational inequality is
prohibited, the law has been violated, evaded, or frustrated with virtual
impunity, and now evasions and violations seem to have the support
of the highest offices in government.
I. Tim DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW TO Brown v.
Board of Education
Up to now the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal educational opportunity could be
read as an open-ended proscription against all forms of invidious dis-
crimination which deprive blacks as a group of those educational ad-
7. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). Like the Supreme Court,
"we must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present
place in American life throughout the nation." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
8. J. COLEmAN, supra note 5, at 1.
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vantages and opportunities made available to whites at public expense.
This approach of the Court is now approximately twenty years old and
evolved out of its unsuccessful attempt to make the "separate but
equal" doctrine serve the cause of equal treatment.
The "separate but equal" concept predates the fourteenth amend-
ment. It had its origin in a decision by the Massachusetts Supreme
Court in Roberts v. City of Boston.' The doctrine was adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson, as
properly defining the scope and meaning of the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal treatment requirement with respect to black citizens.
With that decision, apartheid, with its implicit justification for grossly
disparate allocation of resources and facilities between whites and
blacks, was afforded constitutional sanction on a national scale. A
typical example of how southern states operated under this standard is
found in the per-pupil expenditure for black and white school children
in several states during the 1949-50 school term: Alabama, $130.09
for whites, $92.69 for blacks; Arkansas, $123.60 for whites, $73.03 for
blacks; Florida, $196.42 for whites, $136.71 for blacks; Georgia,
$145.15 for whites, $79.73 for blacks; Maryland, $217.41 for whites,
$198.76 for blacks; Mississippi, $122.93 for whites, $32.55 for blacks;
North Carolina, $148.21 for whites, $122.90 for blacks; South Caro-
lina, $154.62 for whites, $79.82 for blacks; District of Columbia,
$289.68 for whites, $220.74 for blacks.10
Although Plessy v. Ferguson involved the validity of racial segre-
gation in railroad cars, and in 1917 the Court explicitly repudiated
Plessy's application to housing," it was assumed until Brown v. Board
of Education was decided that "separate but equal" was the appropri-
ate constitutional yardstick in considering claims of educational depri-
vation based upon race or color.
In 1938, in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,12 the Supreme Court
for the first time sought to place strictures upon the application of the
"separate but equal" concept by insisting that equal facilities in fact
9. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).
10. Blose & Jaracz, State School Systems: Statistical Summary for 1949-50, Table
43 at 105, in DEP'T. OF HEW, BiENNIL. SURVEY OF EDUCATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1948-50 (1954).
11. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917).
12. 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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be provided as a precondition to constitutional sanction of racial segre-
gation.
Gaines made inevitable the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954, outlawing racial segregation in the Nation's public
schools. Sixteen years intervened between the two decisions, but in
reformulating the "separate but equal" doctrine by making the thresh-
old requirement the assurance that equal facilities were being provided,
the Court laid the basis for the doctrine's ultimate rejection. The cer-
tainty of this development is crystal-clear only in retrospect, but part of
the legal strategy that underlay Gaines was to secure a stone-for-stone,
book-for-book "separate but equal" constitutional yardstick in the hope
that the maintenance of segregated educational facilities might be ren-
dered so burdensome and expensive as to cause the voluntary aban-
donment of the practice.
In 1950, with Sweatt v. Painter 3 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 4 "separate but equal" was virtually abandoned, but the Court
refused to accede to the request of the complaining parties to overrule
Plessy v. Ferguson.
In Sweatt the question was whether a recently established law school
for blacks was the substantial equivalent of the University of Texas
Law School. The question was answered in the negative. "Few stu-
dents and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an
academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the ex-
change of views with which the law is concerned."' 1 Here the Court's
commitment to the elimination of constitutional support for segrega-
tion was made manifest.
That commitment was even more clearly shown in the McLaurin
case, decided the same day. McLaurin received the same courses of
instruction as his fellow white students, but he was kept separate and
apart from others pursuant to restrictions imposed. The Court con-
cluded that the university regulations handicapped McLaurin in his
pursuit of graduate instruction by inhibiting and impairing his ability
to study, to engage in discussion and the exchange of views with fel-
low students, and "in general, to learn his profession."' 6 The convic-
13. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
14. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
15. 339 U.S. at 634.
16. 339 U.S. at 641.
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tion that racial restrictions personally interfere with the individual's
ability to learn, first articulated in this case, was to become the Court's
central thesis four years later in Brown v. Board of Education.
In the latter case, the Court took the final step of eviscerating Ples-
sy v. Ferguson, holding that "separate but equal" had no place in the
field of education and that racial segregation constituted a denial of
equal educational opportunity within the meaning of the Constitution's
proscription.
In subsequent holdings, Brown was interpreted as requiring not only
desegregation in pupil enrollment but desegregation in faculty assign-
ment as well. 17 Moreover, Brown became the precedent for the
Court's outlawing of enforced racial segregation in virtually all aspects
of American life.' s
Sweatt, McLaurin, and Brown struck down specific racial restric-
tions: the segregated law school, regulations designed to keep black
and white students separate and apart on the university campus, and
the dual public school system, respectively. Yet there is a common
thread that makes these three cases one: an attempt to give definition
in real-life terms to those practices that in fact deny equality of educa-
tional opportunity to blacks and thus should become subject to consti-
tutional prohibition.
Brown was the culmination of this effort. Although a milestone in
achievement, Brown could not be regarded as the final word-indeed,
what the Court had promised in Gaines to Sweatt, through McLaurin
and to Brown was a continuing realism, which would require appraisal
and evaluation of every substantial claim by blacks of educational
deprivation, to decide whether and the extent to which such denial was
a violation of the Constitution's guarantee of equal education.
But the promise has not been kept. The Court has not moved be-
yond Brown in its substantive determinations of what constitutes a de-
nial of equal education in its constitutional dimensions. Indeed the
promise, limited by the terms of "all deliberate speed," has not yet
been enforced to abolish completely the dual school system in the
17. Rogers v. Paul, 382 U.S. 198 (1965); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103
(1965).
18. See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Johnson v. Vir-
ginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); State Comm'n v. Dorsey,
359 U.S. 533 (1959).
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South where Brown is directly applicable under its most restrictive
interpretation.
II. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF Brown IN THE SOUTH
A. The Pace of Desegregation
Southern resistance to the mandate of Brown is so well chronicled
that it requires only brief mention in this paper. Southern officialdom
initially responded to Brown with a program of "massive resistance"
which relied on such tactics as the use of the National Guard and the
closing of public schools in order to prevent blacks from going to
school with whites. 19 After the Court declared these blatant practices
unlawful, school boards utilized a variety of tactics to prevent integra-
tion on anything more than a token basis, including pupil placement
and assignment laws, state supported private schools, and freedom of
choice. Each of the delaying tactics was ultimately declared unlawful;
and in Griffin v. County School Board20 the Court even declared that
the time for all deliberate speed had passed. Nevertheless, very little
integration of students was achieved during the first decade and a half
following Brown. By the 1963-1964 school term, the eleven states of
the old confederacy had only 1.17 percent of their black children in
schools with white children. 21 That figure had only grown to approxi-
mately twenty-five percent by September 1969, chiefly as a result of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the enforcement activities of the De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare.
In Green v. County School Board,22 the Court finally made clear
that its ruling in Brown actually required integration of students. The
Court rejected a freedom of choice plan under which only fifteen per-
cent of black children received an integrated education and required
school boards "to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to
work; and promises realistically to work now. '' 23 The Court specifically
instructed the district court to take into account the techniques of
geographic zoning and school consolidation (or pairing) which in
19. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
20. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
21. United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 854 n.36 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
22. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
23. Id. at 439 (emphasis original).
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New Kent County would have the effect of requiring that all students
attend school on an integrated basis.
It is recognized that in large part success in frustrating effective im-
plementation of Brown in the South was the Supreme Court's failure
to require school authorities to make a total reorganization of school
districts. Instead they were allowed to assign children to school on the
same basis as had existed under the dual school system, with black
children being forced, therefore, to seek reassignment if any desegre-
gation was to occur. The Court explained in Green that its policy had
been decided upon deliberately, and that it had been designed to en-
able black children courageous enough to break with tradition to ob-
tain a position in the white school. Ironically this reasoning reveals
precisely why the policy was flawed. Because it would take personal
courage for black children to assert themselves in vindication of what
had been declared to be their rights, the Court should have devised a
policy for the transformation from a segregated to a nonsegregated
school system which would not have made it necessary for black chil-
dren and their parents to carry the burden virtually alone. Brown
imposed an obligation of compliance on the state; school authorities
should have been required at the outset to reassign all children, black
and white, to schools within the school district pursuant to the pre-
requisites of the Brown decision. In the long run, perhaps no differ-
ence in result of consequence would have occurred, but the Court
might have realized sooner than it did that a new approach was needed
if the constitutional objectives Brown established were to be realized.
Moreover, it is unseemly to suggest that declared constitutional guar-
antees of equality must stand or fall on the mettle and tenacity of in-
dividual blacks; on the contrary, implementation of these fundamental
rights are more properly the business of the society.
At any rate, Green quickened the pace of desegregation in the South.
Plaintiffs in school desegregation cases throughout the South sought
new court orders which would immediately integrate their schools. In
August of 1969, thirty-three of these cases were brought before the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, all presenting the question of whether
the court should grant a delay or order immediate implementation of
desegregation plans.24 The Fifth Circuit granted the delay and the
24. Many of these desegregation plans were prepared by officials of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare. However, the Secretary of the Department
wrote a letter to the court in support of the request for a delay.
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Supreme Court reversed in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Ed-
cation.25 In Alexander the Supreme Court not only requested imme-
diate implementation of a desegregation plan, but also ordered that
such a plan be put into effect prior to any court hearing on objections
or modifications to the plan. In short, school boards were required,
at last, to integrate and then litigate.
On remand, the Fifth Circuit ordered that faculties be integrated in
the middle of the school year; but again delayed student integration
until the following September. Again, the Supreme Court ordered ex-
pedited proceedings, reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision, and required
that students also be integrated in the middle of the school year.20
Following Green, Alexander and Carter, the most important school
desegregation cases have dealt with issues concerning the appropriate
techniques for achieving equal educational opportunity. The two tech-
niques which have produced the greatest controversy are, of course,
busing and metropolitanism (redrawing school district lines to include
the central city and its surrounding suburbs). Given the degree to
which blacks are increasingly becoming concentrated in the central
cores of large southern cities, it would appear that both busing and
metropolitanism must be utilized in order to fully implement the basic
principles of Brown.
The Supreme Court approved use of busing in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Board of Education." The significance of this case lies
in its objective and realistic treatment of the question. From the
cacophony of anti-busing hysteria one would be led to believe that bus-
ing is an altogether new phenomenon, utilized only to accomplish de-
segregation. The Court through Mr. Chief Justice Burger put the issue
in its proper perspective. He said:
Bus transportation has been an integral part of the public educational
system for years, and was perhaps the single most important factor in
the transition from the one room schoolhouse to the consolidated school.
Eighteen million of the Nation's public school children, approximately
39%, were transported to their schools by bus in 1969-1970 in all
parts of the country.28
This statement makes unmistakably clear, of course, that the trans-
25. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
26. Carter v. West Feliciana School Bd., 396 U.S. 226 (1969).
27. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
28. Id. at 29.
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portation of children to school by bus cannot be and is not objected to
per se. The real outcry is against the desegregation process at the
end of the bus ride. There is no great objection, it should be added,
when black children are taken by bus to segregated schools, which
was, of course, in the pre-Brown era, standard operating procedure in
the South.
The Court ruled out the impractical and irrational in court-ordered
busing. The opinion continues:
An objection to transportation of students may have validity when
the time and distance of travel is so great as to risk either the health of
the children or significantly impinge on the educational process. Dis-
trict courts must weigh the soundness of any transportation plan ....
It hardly needs stating that the limits on travel will vary with many
factors, but probably with none more than the age of the students. The
reconciliation of competing values in a desegregation case is, of course,
a difficult task with many sensitive facets but fundamentally no more
so than remedial measures courts of equity have traditionally em-
ployed.29
This attempt to bring sanity and rationality to all questions that had
been distorted by emotionalism unhappily did not have the desired ef-
fect. The President chose to seek whatever political mileage he might
secure in an anti-busing stand. He helped keep the heat by statements
which sought to picture advocates of busing for desegregation as wild-
eyed zealots intent on transporting children all over the lot to insure
school integration. He threatened with dismissal any member of
HEW's staff who sought to force school districts to desegregate through
extensive use of busing. The Chief Justice helped abet Presidential
politics by taking the occasion, in denying a stay of court-ordered bus-
ig, to explain-where no clarification was needed-that Swann had
not been intended to require court-ordered busing and to set forth the
limits of court discretion in mandating busing to achieve effective de-
segregation. 30 This explanation was mailed to every United States
District Court and federal judge in the South.
Since then has come the clamor for a constitutional amendment, the
House and Senate bills, and the President's speech and proposed mora-
torium. As noted above, the outcome of these attempts to bar busing
29. Id. at 30-31.
30. Winston-Salem Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1227-31 (1971). A
rehearing in Swann had already been denied, 403 U.S. 912 (1971).
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by statutes or constitutional amendment remains in doubt; but a statute,
if passed, will certainly require litigation to determine its constitution-
ality. It would seem doubtful that lower courts will order desegrega-
tion plans based on busing until the constitutionality of such legislation
has been determined.
In Bradley v. School Board of Richmond," the Eastern District of
Virginia recently required that three school boards in the Richmond area
be operated on a metropolitan or merged basis. The case is presently
being appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Many believe that this is the
only approach to effective desegregation that will work in urban areas.
Because of segregated housing patterns, blacks are increasingly clustered
in central cities in an urban complex. In such cases whites move to
surrounding suburbs which effectively prevents black penetration. The
schools in the central city became increasingly black, while those in the
surrounding suburbs are largely white. If equal educational opportunity
requires a classroom mix, the merger of the city school districts with
those in the suburbs for school organization purposes will produce such
an intermixture. However, the vitality of metropolitanism, of course,
will in large part depend on the busing controversy.
B. Problems Arising in the Wake of Desegregation
While the actual enforcement of Brown is only in its beginning
stages-and whether it will ever be fully enforced remains in doubt-
black students and teachers residing in recently desegregated districts
have not been accorded equal treatment. Black teachers and princi-
pals have been discriminatorily discharged and demoted on a large
scale; black schools have been closed without regard to their fitness as
educational institutions; schools named after famous blacks have been
renamed and black students have been discriminatorily subjected to
arbitrary and unfair discipline.
In addition to declaring unlawful the segregation of pupils, Brown
v. Board of Education, also held unconstitutional segregation of teach-
ers, principals and other personnel. However, in the first decade after
Brown, southern school boards made even fewer efforts at desegrega-
tion of teachers and administrative personnel than of pupils. Courts
permitted this inaction with respect to teachers and administrative per-
31. 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd, Nos. 72-1058-60, 72-1150, (4th Cir.,
June 5, 1972).
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sonnel without granting a hearing "until the desegregation of pupils
has been accomplished or had made substantial progress."32 The Su-
preme Court reversed this practice of refusing to grant hearings on
claims by black students for desegregated teachers and administrative
personnel in Bradley v. School Board of Richmond. The Court ruled
that:
There is no merit to the suggestion that the relationship between faculty
allocation on an alleged racial basis and the adequacy of the desegrega-
tion plans is entirely speculative. Nor can we perceive any reasons for
postponing these hearings .... 33
Following Bradley, the lower courts began to require that school
boards make at least some effort toward desegregation of faculty and
administrative personnel. Some courts focused on the specific results
to be obtained by reassignment of teachers;34 other courts focused on
the mechanics of faculty integration without detailing the specific num-
ber of teachers to be assigned each school;3 5 and still others merely
emphasized the need to undo the effects of past discriminatory assign-
ments without mentioning specific results or mechanics. These cases
are summarized in the Fifth Circuit's comprehensive decision in United
States v. Jefferson County Board of Education.36
The different approaches to faculty integration were made irrelevant
by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Montgomery
County Board of Education.37  In the Montgomery County case the
Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and reinstated as within its discretion
a district court's ruling requiring that the school board, insofar as prac-
ticable, assign teachers so that "in each school the ratio of white to
Negro faculty members is substantially the same as it is throughout
the system." 38
32. Augustus v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 306 F.2d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 1962).
33. 382 U.S. 103, 105 (1965).
34. Kier v. County School Bd., 249 F. Supp. 239 (W.D. Va. 1966); Dowell v.
School Bd., 244 F. Supp. 971 (W.D. Okla. 1965), modified, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
35. Gilliam v. School Bd. of Hopewell, 11 RACE RE. L. REP. 1297 (E.D. Va.
1966); Beckett v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 185 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Va. 1959), aff'd sub
nom. Hill v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 282 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1960).
36. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), affd en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
37. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
38. Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 289 F. Supp. 647, 654 (M.D. Ala.
1968).
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The courts of appeals interpreted Montgomery County to require that
school boards racially balance their faculties according to blacks and
whites in the district, and decisions ordering faculty desegregation,
like orders requiring pupil desegregation, were required to be imple-
mented immediately. 39
As courts began to require that school boards actually desegregate
faculties and administrative personnel, the black teachers and admin-
istrators quickly lost the job security which inheres in the dual system;
school boards reacted to the requirement that faculty and administra-
tive staff be integrated, in part, by discharging or demoting large num-
bers of black teachers and principals. The school boards' inclination
to dismiss or demote black teachers and administrators increased,
it seems, proportionately with the Court's requirement that they, in
fact, desegregate faculty and administrative staff. Discharge and de-
motion of teachers and administrators increased dramatically in the
period immediately following the cases enforcing the Supreme Court's
decision in Montgomery County.
A 1970 report on the status of school desegregation in the South,
based on monitoring 400 desegregating school districts, reveals start-
ling facts.40 The report indicates that in at least thirty-four cases,
black principals were discriminatorily dismissed, and that in 194, or
sixty-three percent, of the districts being monitored, at least 386 black
principals were demoted. Many of the demoted principals were made
"assistant principals" and given trivial or undefined duties despite the
fact that they frequently had better credentials and greater experience
than the white principals they were assigned to work under. A large
number of the black principals were simply made classroom teachers.
The same report shows that 127 of the monitored districts discharged
or refused to renew contracts for at least 462 black teachers. School
boards gave a variety of reasons for terminating black teachers, includ-
ing a reduction in the number of students ("white flight"); the elimi-
nation of duplicate courses and facilities; and the "incompetency" or
lack of qualification of the black teachers, many of whom had taught
black children for many years in these same school systems. The re-
port further indicated that 103 of the districts studied had demoted
39. See Singleton v. Jackson Mun. School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).
40. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMrrEE, THE STATUS OF SCHOOL DESEOREGA-
7ToN iN TnE SOUTH (1970).
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black teachers by reassigning them to subjects outside the field for
which they had training or experience; reducing them from the high
school to the junior high or elementary school levels. In many in-
stances, black teachers were reassigned as assistants or teacher aides
to white teachers, or were assigned to federally funded special pro-
grams, such as the Head Start Program. Still other black teachers
were reassigned to nonteaching jobs, such as bus drivers, or given
study hall duty. Black coaches and band directors were the hardest
hit group, frequently being demoted to assistant coach, physical educa-
tion teacher, or playground director.
The National Education Association has carefully collected the sta-
tistics showing discharge and demotion of black teachers and princi-
pals in the desegregating school districts which file reports with the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare in the years 1968, 1969
and 1970.41 The statistics indicate that the report cited above only
shows the tip of the iceberg and that the ranks of black teachers and ad-
ministrators have been practically decimated during the desegregation
process.
The courts and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
perhaps in anticipation of mass dismissal and demotion of black teach-
ers and administrators, articulated fairly strong protections for the job
security of black teachers and administrators. HEW and the courts
required that teachers and staff displaced by the desegregation process
be given a priority for re-employment over those coming from outside
the system. They also required that school boards which reduced the
size of their staff as a result of the desegregation process make a com-
parative evaluation of all teachers and/or administrators in the sys-
tem and eliminate the least qualified, irrespective of race.42
However, HEW and the courts are either unable or unwilling effec-
tively to enforce their protective rulings as is attested by the statistical
41. See Brief for The National Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae, United States
v. Georgia, 445 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1971), reprinted in Hearings on Equal Educa-
tional Opportunity Before the Senate Select Committee on Educational Equal Oppor-
tunity, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 10, at 5025-5119 (1971).
42. Singleton v. Jackson Mun. School Dist., 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965);
Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. § 181.13 (1968). See also United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en bane, 380 F.2d 385
(5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Caddo Parish School Bd. v. United States,
389 U.S. 840 (1967).
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evidence compiled above. The magnitude of the problem would
seem to indicate that a judicial approach could not effectively address
itself to the problem since the judicial process proceeds on a case by
case basis, and requires substantial resources far beyond the means of
individual or small groups of teachers and administrators. HEW on
the other hand utilizes administrative procedures which are typically
more expeditious and less expensive. We are unable to locate any
evidence that HEW has terminated federal funds from a single school
district for discriminatory practices against black teachers and prin-
cipals; however, in December, 1970 the Office of Education an-
nounced a program of training and retraining to assist teachers and
administrators displaced by the desegregation process.
Despite their overall ineffectiveness, courts have continued to in-
crease the stringency of their protection to black teachers and admin-
istrators. In Chambers v. Hendersonville Board of Education,43 and
more recently in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dis-
trict,44 attempts to make a wholesale reduction in the number of black
teachers were held unlawful. "Objective standards" for the employ-
ment and retention of teachers to be applied to black and white teach-
ers alike were ordered effectuated.
In Singleton "demotion" was defined to include any reassignment
that yields less pay or responsibility, requires a lesser degree of skill,
or requires a staff member to teach a subject or grade outside his area
of certification or in which he has not had experience within five years.
This definition is particularly important in the face of charges, which
appear credible, that many school boards reassigned black teachers
outside their area of certification or experience and, based upon their
performance in that assignment, discharged the black teacher on the
grounds of "incompetency."
McFerren v. County Board of Education of Fayette County,4" in-
volved the school board's attempt, as part of the desegregation process,
to discharge a disproportionate number of black teachers (15-7), al-
legedly on the grounds that they had failed to meet the state's law gov-
erning tenure and were thus not qualified. Most of the blacks serving
in the system's predominately black schools had worked for many
43. 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1966).
44. 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970).
45. McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ., 455 F.2d 199 (6th Cir. 1972).
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years, whereas only one of the whites had more than two years service.
The court observed that the board had obviously considered the teach-
ers good enough teachers to teach black students, but suddenly deter-
mined in the face of the desegregation order that they were not good
enough to teach white students; it required the board to shoulder the
burden of proving that the discharges were based on definite non-
discriminatory, objective standards.
The court in Lee v. Macon County Board of Education46 also adopt-
ed the doctrine that school boards have the burden of proving the lack
of qualifications of a principal who was regarded as qualified prior to
the desegregation order. The court stated:
The Board must show the former principal to be independently unqual-
ified to assume the new opening. And in order to fulfill that burden
the Board would have to establish quite clearly why one who was qual-
ified prior to a desegregation order suddenly became unqualified after
the order.4 7
The court required the school board to appoint the plaintiff, who
had been demoted to the position of director of a Head Start program,
as principal at one of the integrated schools where a vacancy had oc-
curred. Perhaps more importantly, the court articulated the relation-
ship between the right of black students to equal educational oppor-
tunities and nondiscriminatory employment opportunities for black
teachers and administrators. The court declared:
. . . We find it impossible not to conclude that the same feeling of in-
feriority inevitably results among the students when the leaders of the
educational processes-the principals, the teachers, and the adminis-
trators-are likewise separated from principals, administrators, teach-
ers and students of other races.
• . . The entire rationale of desegregation would be seriously if not fa-
tally undermined if faculties and principalships remained segregated
even in fully integrated classrooms.48
That trend seems to have slowed if not stopped. Urban school dis-
tricts at least appear to be actively recruiting black faculty and admin-
istrators and one can interpret McFerren and Lee v. Macon County as
indicating a greater awareness by the courts of their responsibility to
prevent the massive discriminatory elimination of black faculty and
46. 453 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971).
47. Id. at 1110.
48. Id.
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staff. This is not to suggest, however, that the need to insure equal
employment opportunity for black educators is merely a transitory
problem. Like other aspects of the racial relations syndrome in this
country, it would appear that this question with greater or lesser in-
tensity will remain a problem with us for years to come.
I. THE RESPONSE TO Brown IN THE NORTH
A. Equal Educational Opportunity in the North
Before the Brown decision the assurances of northern educators
that public schools were offering all children appropriate access to
equal educational opportunity was not seriously challenged. The at-
tack on the denial of equal educational opportunity in the North, how-
ever, followed close on the heels of Brown.
In 1955 the New York City Board of Education, which had been
assuring the public that quality education was being offered in the
city's schools of high black and Puerto Rican concentration on a par
with that being afforded in the city's white middle class schools, was
prodded into authorizing a study by the Public Education Association
to settle the question. The study, of course, revealed what common
sense had long perceived, that the predominantly black and Puerto
Rican schools of the city were not in parity in respect of quality. The
PEA study compared the schools on the basis of the composite scores
made in standardized city-wide achievement tests. These scores re-
vealed that the schools populated largely by black and Puerto Rican
children were roughly one half year behind the predominantly white
schools in reading, writing and arithmetic at the fourth grade, one
and one half years behind at the sixth grade, and a staggering two and
one half years behind at the eighth grade. 49
Today this is generally conceded to be an accurate profile of the ed-
ucational gap between blacks and whites in the public school systems
of the North and West where black-white school separation exists.
This northern phenomenon of black-white school separation has been
called de facto school segregation, or racial imbalance. Although the
inevitable consequence of correlating a neighborhood school policy to
a pattern of housing segregation, unless the court found school board
49. PUBLIC EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, STATUS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL EDUCATION OF
NEGRO AND PUERTO RICAN CHILDREN (1955).
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contrivance in maintaining or perpetuating the pattern, the resulting
separation was considered adventitious when attack on the northern
problem reached the courts in the early 1960's.
Northern educators argued that the real problem of outright educa-
tional denial and deprivation was a southern problem and were scan-
dalized by the vehemence of the criticisms and charges of racism that
were being made by blacks in respect of the quality of education being
afforded black children in northern school systems. What was not
understood is that Brown had fathered a major social upheaval in race
relations in this country. Northern "good will" and "good intentions"
evidenced in its various statutes and ordinances barring racial discrimina-
tion were no longer enough.50 The basic question was whether discrim-
ination was being effectively controlled or proscribed. Legal attacks
soon began on northern style black-white separation.5'
The attack did not fare as well as had the attack against formal
segregation in the South. School separation in the North, unlike the
formally mandated segregation in the South, gives the appearance of
inevitability and school board innocence. On the surface there is no
apparently discernable distinction between the black and white schools
as to what is afforded and what is withheld. Moreover, invidious ra-
cial considerations influence educational practices only sub silentio
and northern educators have succeeded in convincing the public that
the policies underlying the choice of various educational policies or
practices and forms of school administration are based solely on con-
siderations of educational excellence. In truth such decisions are af-
fected by a wide ranging variety of factors, fiscal and political con-
siderations, tradition and race. These factors, judicial ignorance con-
cerning possible alternatives to the school assignment policy under at-
tack, and diffidence about the expertise of the professional educator,
initially led to the courts' reluctance to intervene. An example, of
course, is the neighborhood school policy, which northern educators
are wont to defend as indispensable for quality education, it being, in
their judgment, one of the best methods for producing a cooperative
50. See Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MicH. L. REv. 237,
246 et seq. (1968).
51. See, e.g., Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dis-
missed, 288 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.), aff'd and enforced, 195 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y.),
affrd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961); Fisher v. Board of
Educ., 8 R.ca REL. L. REP. 730 (N.J. Comm'r of Educ. 1963).
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school-home relationship conducive to the educational development of
the child.
Yet in our mobile society, that contention will not withstand even
cursory scrutiny. One of the chief consequences of the neighborhood
school policy has been that the school reflects the socio-economic and
racial characteristics of the neighborhood it serves. The result is
schools of high and low quality, with a direct correlation between the
quality of the educational product and the socio-economic status of the
neighborhood served. The neighborhood school policy perpetuates in
the classroom the socio-economic and racial stratification characteristic
of the residential patterns of the community. Therefore, educators
who defend and enforce this policy in our multiracial society, with its
increasingly fixed socio-economic stratification, should be required to
spell out with exactness the essential educational ingredients necessary
to ensure equal educational opportunity for those attending a school
serving a low socio-economic neighborhood as contrasted with a school
serving a high socio-economic neighborhood-one serving blacks and
one serving whites.
The argument for the neighborhood school policy may have abstract
appeal, but the demonstrated operative effect of the policy itself is to
provide the most and best in educational resources to affluent whites
and the least and worst to poor blacks. Such a result can hardly be
supportive of considerations of educational excellence. A southern
judge put his finger squarely on the pulse of the real issue when he
said:
The system of assigning pupils by "neighborhoods" with "freedom of
choice" for both pupils and faculty, superimposed upon an urban pop-
ulation pattern where Negro residents have become concentrated al-
most entirely in one quadrant of a city of 270,000, is racially discrimi-
natory. This discrimination discourages initiative and makes quality
education impossible. The quality of public education should not de-
pend on the economic or racial accident of the neighborhood in which
a child's parents have chosen to live-or find they must live-nor on
the color of his skin. The neighborhood school concept never pre-
vented statutory racial segregation; it may not now be validly used to
perpetuate segregation. 52
52. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1360
(W.D.N.C. 1969) (emphasis added).
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The school district, another example, is supported on the grounds
that decentralized authority is more practical for the administration of
what is said to be an essentially local concern. Since a school dis-
trict's principal benefit will be to the community it serves, it has been
regarded as a matter of sound political judgment that the district itself
should possess a significant degree of control over the administration
and financing of the district's schools. On the shoulders of the local
community is left the burden of weighing the benefits of more modern
educational facilities against a smaller tax, or the need for imposing a
heavier tax levy to keep an inadequate educational plant limping along.
Moreover, furtherance of local concern for education, interest, and in-
itiative is said to be the generating force behind the state funding for-
mula that results in wide variations in the financial support for public
education from district to district within each state. The degree of
variation differs from state to state, but intrastate variation is even
more pronounced, with the wealthiest school district within the state
sometimes spending as much as five times more per pupil than the
poorest district.
The reality is that a school district's size, its shape, and the quality
of education it offers are more often than not determined on a hap-
hazard basis without any acceptable rational underpinning. In the
main, the once unstated but now increasingly open determinant is the
protection of the interests of the white middle class. Here fiscal and
political considerations carry far more weight than does concern for
educational excellence for all. There have been some recent sporadic
efforts to reduce the number of school districts in a state, but this
activity has usually been ad hoc, without being linked to any state-wide
plan to redesign school districts in an attempt to provide a reasonable
basis for interdistrict educational equality.
In sum, at present, the implementation of a neighborhood school
policy or the size of a school district is determined without a valid or
rational educational basis and is not designed to produce equality of
educational opportunity, either educationally or constitutionally.
In addition, the professional educator has fostered the belief that
academic disparities evidenced in the predominantly black schools re-
sult from causes over which the public school system has no control:
socio-economic factors and incidents of family life; that the massive
academic failure of the black child is not the responsibility of the
school, its methodology, administration, or personnel; that the black
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child is uneducable because of background deprivations and disabili-
ties, familial and environmental.
This somewhat crude and cruel rationalization, which is closely akin
to the concept of genetic inferiority and gives the lie to the protestation
that ours is an open society, has now fallen out of fashion. The cur-
rent thesis is that the educational deprivations of blacks are the prod-
uct of social-class factors; that blacks cannot improve their current de-
pressed socio-economic status without the elimination of educational
deficiencies, and since these are predetermined by class, little hope is
held of the black underclass ever achieving equal educational oppor-
tunity.
Neither theory, however, gives a true or accurate picture. Public
education, in quality and distribution, is the result in great part of
political power. Since the dominant and controlling political power is
in the hands of the white middle class, that class uses its strength to
corner for itself a disproportionate share of available educational re-
sources, thereby insuring the perpetuation of its dominant authority.
Thus, while the disparities may not be indigenous to class or socio-
economic status, that is what the reality is made to appear.
In view of the powerlessness of the black underclass, this current
rationalization leaves one extremely pessimistic about blacks securing
equal educational opportunities in the foreseeable future. There is a
great difference, however, in focusing on the privileges and preroga-
tives of power as a link to education deprivation, rather than on the
personal weaknesses of black children based upon a background of
social and economic deprivation, for then one may conclude that much
of the evil lies in the maldistribution of educational resources rather
than in the innate character of the black poor. The fact that the pub-
lic school system as it is now organized has evidenced little influence
on the child's achievement, independent of background and social
class, does not then conclusively demonstrate that social class deter-
mines educational achievement, but rather that social class-specifi-
cally, the white middle class-has determined the form and substance
of school organization, orientation, and methodology, which just may
not provide an accurate yardstick for determining the educational po-
tential of non-white middle class groups.
As had been said, these factors and judicial ignorance concerning
possible alternatives to the school assignment policy under attack, dif-
fidence about intervening in what was regarded, not surprisingly, as
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being the appropriate province of the professional educator, initially
led to court reluctance to intervene. Moreover, until recently, courts
seemed to look upon the neighborhood school policy and state funding
formula which provides disparate per pupil expenditures within each
state as sacrosanct. The Princeton Plan (assigning children to school
by grade), school pairing, busing, redrawing zone lines, and the public
school complex (locating all the elementary, junior and senior high
schools in one location, thus eliminating school assignment on the basis
of residence), are today far more familiar concepts to courts and the
public in general than was true at the beginning of the attack on de
facto segregation in the North. In addition, the judiciary was un-
doubtedly alarmed at assuming the reponsibility for so huge a task as
seeking a remedy to de facto school segregation that results in effective
school desegregation in a school district containing a black community
of considerable geographic expanse and population, with its burden-
some and apparently insoluble demographic and topographic prob-
lems.
At first, northern federal courts gave Brown a restricted rather than
expansive application to claims of denial of equal educational oppor-
tunity. The leading case, which set the prevailing federal pattern until
recently was Bell v. School City of Gary.53 There the court took the
view that school separation not shown to result from the deliberate or
conscious action of school authorities could not be considered incon-
sistent with the fourteenth amendment's equal education guarantee.
The court discussed evidence of academic disparity between schools
for blacks and whites as throwing "little or no light on the quality of
instruction unless there is a corresponding showing of ability to
achieve. '5 4  And, it should be added, the professional educator's dis-
claimer of responsibility had been so widely accepted that neither Bell,
nor the cases that adopted its approach, required school authorities to
equalize the educational offerings between whites and blacks, despite
a showing that measurable inequalities existed.
Some of the state courts at the outset took a more advanced view.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that school authorities are re-
53. 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. de-
nied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). See also Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 244 F. Supp. 572
(S.D. Ohio 1965), aff'd in part, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
847 (1967). But see Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Okla. 1963),
aff'd in part, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967).
54. Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819, 828 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
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quired to eliminate as much black-white school segregation as can be
done consistently with sound educational practices." The California
Supreme Court seems to be of the same view.56 In New York, the
power of the State Commissioner of Education to order local boards
to remove de facto segregation has been upheld as an appropriate exer-
cise of the Commissioner's authority to determine educational policy
for the state.57  Illinois and Massachusetts have sought to ban the
practice by statute. The United States Supreme Court has refused,
thus far, to review a case dealing with the constitutional validity of
de facto school segregation, denying certiorari in both the cases find-
ing de facto segregation invalid and those finding that the issue raises
no constitutional question. Obviously, the Court is seeking to keep
its options open for as long as it can.
Recently, however, federal court decisions have shifted markedly.
Hobson v. Hansenr8 may have started the trend away from Bell. In a
searching and comprehensive examination of the policies and practices
of a big city school district with a large black school population, Judge
J. Skelly Wright sought in the Hobson case to secure (1) a practicable
immediate remedy by ordering the equalization of tangible facilities on
modem Plessy v. Ferguson terms; (2) a constitutional guarantee of
equal educational opportunity not only for blacks on racial grounds
but also for the poor and economically underprivileged as an economic
equal protection guarantee; and (3) a constitutional proscription
against de facto school segregation as an inevitable denial of equal ed-
ucational opportunity. The underlying basis of his decision, however,
was school board responsibility, without regard to considerations of in-
tent or motive, to meet its constitutional obligation of providing equal
educational opportunity to black children and the poor. If the result
is unequal educational opportunity, school authorities have to under-
take effective remedial action. The more recent cases where school
authorities have been ordered to correct racial imbalance have been in
line with this thesis. 59
55. Booker v. Board of Educ., 45 N.J. 161, 212 A.2d 1 (1965).
56. Jackson v. Pasadena School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr.
606 (1963).
57. In re Vetere v. Allen, 15 N.Y.2d 259, 206 N.E.2d 174, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77,
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965).
58. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
59. Soria v. Oxnard School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 155 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Kelly v.
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And, although decided in a southern city, Bradley v. School Board
of Richmond was an acceptance of Judge Wright's concept of metro-
politanism as a necessary formula to effectuate the Constitution's equal
education guarantee where the predominantly black central city school
population is surrounded by largely white suburban school popula-
tion. The basic rationale is that a racially integrated school is an es-
sential ingredient of equal educational opportunity.
B. The State Funding Formula for Public Education
The differences between the North and South with respect to equal
educational opportunity are largely matters of degree. The South uti-
lized the dual school system as a vehicle to achieve a differential in
financial support for the education of blacks and whites. The North
has accomplished the same result by use of the neighborhood school,
the school districting process, and the state funding formula.
The idea of organizing a school system to serve particular areas
within a district, dividing the state into a variety of local districts for
school administration, and authorizing these districts to raise funds in
their own communities for school purposes, these efforts being stimu-
lated by supplements from the state treasury, is reasonable enough in
the abstract and seems to be entirely neutral as to race. It is only
when one looks at the practice in operation that the underlying racism
becomes clearly illuminated.
In northern areas the black poor are concentrated more and more
in the cities and middle-class whites in the suburbs. The central cities'
schools thus have become increasingly black, while suburban school
systems remain largely white. The state funding formula, pursuant to
which local districts are allowed to levy a tax on real property for
school purposes, has meant that wealthy suburban communities are far
better able to support a first-rate school system than are the cities.
This results in middle-class whites having more adequate educational
facilities than can be made available to the black poor.
Nor is the matter solely limited to racial differentiation between city
and suburban school systems. The Wyandanch school district in New
Brown, Civ. No. L8-1146 (D. Nev. 1970); Spangler v. Pasadena Bd. of Educ., 311
F. Supp. 501 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Davis v. School Dist. of Pontiac, 309 F. Supp. 734
(E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971);
Johnson v. San Francisco School Dist., 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 669, 92 Cal. Rptr.
309 (1971).
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York with its surrounding communities is an example of black and
white school-district separation and fiscal-resource discrimination in
the suburbs-a prototype in microcosm of the black-central-city-white-
suburban-school picture. Wyandanch is a virtually all-black commu-
nity and an independent, separate school district, surrounded by af-
fluent white school districts. Although Wyandanch taxes itself at a
far higher rate than its surrounding communities, it cannot, because
of its poor tax base, maintain an adequate school system. Except that
the school district is almost all black, its manifest inability to fund an
adequate school system would have resulted long ago in the abolition
of Wyandanch as a school district and its absorption by adjacent
wealthier school districts. This is a situtaion that can be duplicated in
nearly every state in the union.
State power to redistrict for school purposes appears to be absolute.0°
Moreover, where the district lines as drawn create poor districts un-
able to provide equal educational opportunity, the constitutional man-
date would seem to compel the state to redistrict in order to comply
with its basic obligations. The constitutional guarantee is addressed
to the states and would seem to require that equal educational oppor-
tunity have state-wide application. It is not enough that there should
be no educational disparity stemming from state misfeasance, malfea-
sance, or nonfeasance among groups or classes within each local dis-
trict; the guarantee crosses district lines as well. The state cannot
avoid its constitutional obligation by showing of a reasonable basis for
the lines' placement; it must demonstrate a compelling necessity for
the present districting in order to save it from condemnation as an un-
lawful racial grouping of persons for school purposes. 1
At present, each state funding formula produces unequal per-pupil
financial support for education among various districts within the state.
This process and result must be at least constitutionally suspect, if not
plainly illegal. Although a knowledgeable buyer may get more for his
money than one less informed, the assumption must be that in the
public realm, in the absence of proof to the contrary, unequal funds
mean unequal school facilities.
Of course, this is not a complete answer. It may be true that a dol-
lar in Harlem will buy less educationally than a dollar in Scarsdale.
60. See, e.g., People v. Deatherage, 401 Ill. 25, 81 N.E.2d 581 (1948).
61. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964).
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But, at the very least, the Harlem child is entitled to have the same
amount of dollars expended for his education as is spent on the edu-
cation of a child in Scarsdale. When faced with the problem a court
need not decide at once what the remedy should be, or be concerned as to
whether a requirement that funding be equalized will produce the
same educational result. What it may properly do is hold the present
formula unconstitutional, and allow the legislature time to devise a
new funding program in accordance with constitutional standards. If
the legislature fails to act within the time allowed, the court could then
undertake to devise a remedy of its own. This has been the approach
to redistricting for political purposes, and there is little reason to be-
lieve that the same method cannot be utilized here. The first cases
brought to test state funding formulae have been lost at the trial court
and affirmed summarily by the United States Supreme Court.6 2  Now,
however, the matter is getting new consideration by the judiciary;
Serrano v. Priest,63 Van Dusartz v. Hatfield64 and Rodriguez v. San
Antonio65 have struck down state funding formulae on much the same
grounds set forth above. The matter awaits final determination by the
Supreme Court of the United States.
C. Community Control
The feeling is growing that blacks will be educated equally only
when they themselves have some say in the educational process. For
this reason, community control has gained adherents in the black
community. The basic problem with the community control proposals
being offered at present is that only limited authority is delegated to
the local community and the real power remains, as before, in the
hands of the central board of education. Thus, there is little likelihood
that the quality of education being offered to black children will show
any marked improvement pursuant to such experiments, since they
make no real break with the past. Yet, under present conditions no
other avenue seems open if the present generation of black children
who are being educationally short-changed are to be afforded better
educational opportunities.
62. See McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd sub nom.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
63. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
64. 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
65. Rodriguez v. San Antonio School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
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Although the chances seem slim, blacks may nonetheless be able to
produce better educational results, because an all-pervasive rage sur-
facing in the black community, against the deprivations, limitations,
and restrictions imposed on it, and against all things white, may gen-
erate the necessary drive and motivation. It is a somewhat romantic
notion to believe that a disadvantaged minority, without full control
and authority over the schools their children attend, without power
over or control of school financing, will be able, under a so-called
community control which grants the community little power or control
in critical questions of school administration, to make black schools
more educationally viable than are the old-style segregated schools
now functioning North and South. Yet the politics of the situation
leads to the conclusion that this may be the only avenue open. It must
be remembered that this is not 1896 or even 1940. Black pride has
surfaced. Blacks no longer feel incapable of effective action without
white help. Indeed, the current trend is to attempt to galvanize black
resources to get a needed job done in the black community. What-
ever may be the long range prospects of school integration as the ulti-
mate solution, hundreds of thousands of black children are presently
being processed through an educational system which fails to teach
them to read or to write.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The more recent federal decisions were moving in the direction of
requiring school authorities to correct racial imbalance without regard
to the intent. Moreover, Bradley and Serrano evidenced the growing
concept of state responsibility. If, as in Bradley, a classroom mix is
considered critical to effectuate the constitutional guarantee, busing,
metropolitanism, rezoning and various other methods for achieving
this mix will be required as a matter of course. The requirement of
equal funding to effectuate the equal educational guarantee does not
necessarily require classroom mix, but merely equal per capita expend-
iture.
Some deplore Serrano and the concept of community control on the
theory that this is conducive to rationalization of the separate but equal
concept. It is true that these decisions and the idea of community con-
trol are amenable to interpretation which accentuates and fosters sep-
arate but equal. Yet integration alone is obviously not enough to close
the gap between blacks and whites. School authority accountability
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through community control is necessary to protect against discrimina-
tory treatment or policy of school administration and lack of teacher
concern or sensitivity which may chill the black child's interest, initia
tive and sense of worth. And if the concept that the guarantee of
equal educational opportunity must remain a dynamic living force is
kept alive, the move from a concept of "equal" funding for school pur-
poses measured in terms of per capita expenditures to equal funding
necessary to insure equal educational opportunity measured in terms of
educational results achieved is not a long step.
Thus equal funding and a decentralized system of school account-
ability are not necessarily at odds with metropolitanism. Indeed all
three of these current trends must be nurtured if the equal educational
guarantee is to be given concrete and effective implementation in -urban
America.
Both metropolitanism and equal funding have a common rationale-
that of an overriding state responsibility to meet its constitutional ob-
ligations of giving real life meaning to the equal educational oppor-
tunity guarantee. Placing responsibility on school authorities for the
absence of equal education without regard to questions of fault or in-
tent moves us towards a concept of a result oriented obligation. The
community control adherents are of course chiefly concerned with
school programs that will produce "quality education" for black chil-
dren, quality education that will be perceived in the child's mastery of
educational tools. Therefore, all three of these ideas can be given con-
tent which renders them consistent with one another.
After a hesitant start the federal judiciary has sought valiantly to
grapple with the problem of how to effectuate the Constitution's man-
date of equal education in an urban setting. It has chosen to continue
the tradition of attempting to maintain the fourteenth amendment as
an effective living guarantee of the minority rights.
Today, all is confusion. While the pervasiveness of racism is, of
course, a fault, the professional educator must bear a large share of
responsibility for the public confusion, misinformation and emotion-
alism centered around the issue of busing. The professional educator
has failed -us. It is his responsibility to give equal educational oppor-
tunity concreteness and specificity as educational policy. The con-
tours of equal education as a constitutional requirement and its design
as educational policy, practice or methodology should occupy roughly
at least the same terrain. Where educational policy concludes that
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equal education necessitates certain specific practices, a court should
make those practices a part of the equal education guarantee. Edu-
cators have simply failed to inform us what equal education connotes
as educational policy, and the courts have been forced to rely on their
own judgment concerning what the equal education guarantee re-
quires or prohibits.
If equal educational opportunity is a realistic possibility in a segre-
gated setting, educators should say so and document their conclusion
with explanatory professional data. If, as some believe, equal educa-
tion means the complete elimination of policies which result in the ra-
cial isolation of black children in the public schools, educators should
give a definitive explanation as to why school integration is educa-
tionally required, as distinguished from being socially desirable. They
should also tell us what forms of school organization and practices
will be needed and suggest methods that school districts should pur-
sue to reach the desired goals.
It should be the responsibility of educators to inform the public
whether equal educational opportunity is more readily obtained with
or without integration, whether busing to achieve integration is more
educationally harmful to the black or the white child than the status
quo, and what are the real educational (as distinguished from social or
political) benefits to be derived by children, black and white alike,
from being educated together. There might then be greater public
clarity and less hypocrisy.
The basic purpose and meaning of the fourteenth amendment are
being threatened. The attack, although not direct, is nonetheless very
real. There still is majority support for school integration but over-
whelming support for legal restrictions on busing for integration. Yet
realistically, integration without busing is impossible to achieve in ur-
ban America. Perhaps what we are seeing is another indicium of Amer-
ica's dilemma in the racial field.
Whichever strand of legal and constitutional development-integra-
tion or equal facilities with separation-prevails in the immediate fu-
ture, I cannot believe the metropolitanism-integration concept can lie
dormant for long. For that is the only course that will give this coun-
try domestic peace, unity and strength.
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